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I HE purpose of this article is to review U.S. inter-
national trade and financial developments for the
year 1976. However, because much of the data re-
lating to these developments are not available beyond
the second quarter of 1976, the review is limited in
this respect. Since this same limitation was encoun-
tered in the Review article which examined inter-
national transactions for the year 1975, the events of
the last half of 1975 will be briefly recounted here.1
Of particular importance is the pattern of interna-
tional transactions, their impact on the U.S. economy,
and consideration of the movement of exchange rates
between the U.S. dollar and other major currencies.
In this regard attention will be devoted to the Italian
lira, the British pound, and the Mexican peso.
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Reference to the figures presented in Table I indi-
cates that merchandise exports increased during the
third and fourth quarters of 1975 by $711 million and
$1.1 billion, respectively.2 However, during the first
quarter of 1976 merchandise exports declined by $821
million. This decline was evenly divided between
agricultural and non-agricultural goods. A decrease
in capital goods exports, led by a decrease in the
export of civilian aircraft, accounted for most of the
decline in non-agricultural exports. However, mèr-
chandise exports registered a significant turnaround
during the second quarter of 1976, increasing by $1.6
billion. While both agricultural and non-agricultural
exports increased during this quarter, the latter cate-
gory accounted for about two-thirds of the total in-
crease. This was primarily the result of a large
increase in capital goods exports, led again by civilian
aircraft.
1
See Hans H. Heibling, “Foreign Trade and Exchange Rate
Movements in 1975,” this Review (January 1976), pp. 9-14.
2
For a description of the various categories of international
transactions discussed in this article, see any issue of U.S.
International Transactions and Currency Review, published
quarterly by this Bank.
Merchandise imports increased during each quar-
ter from 111/75 to 11/76. During both the first and
second quarter of 1976 the major part of the increase
occurredin the industrial supplies and materials com-
ponent. While petroleum imports increased in both
quarters, the second quarter increase in these im-
ports was particularly large, accounting for nearly
all of the increase in merchandise imports in that
period.
Preliminary data. indicate that both merchandise
exports and imports increased during the third quar-
ter of 1976, with the latter increasing substantially
more than exports. Indications are that these increases
were broadly based across virtually all categories of
imports and exports.
The flow of direct investment between the United
States and the rest of the world changed significantly
between 11/75 and 11/76. Over this four quarter
period, U.S. direct investment abroad increased in
two quarters ($924 million in IV/75 and $63 million
in 1/76) and decreased in two quarters ($1.6 billion
in 111/75 and $2.2 billion in 11/76) relative to the
levels recorded in the respective preceding quarter.
Direct investment in the United States also decreased
during two quarters ($828 million in 111/75 and $2
billion in 1/76) and increased in two quarters (about
$1.3 billion during IV/75 and 11/76) relative to
their respective levels in the preceding quarter. In
fact, during 111/75 and 1/76 foreign direct invest-
ment in the United States was actually negative. The
$728 million disinvestment recorded in 1/76 was a
record decrease for the post-war period. However,
during 11/76 the flow of direct investment into the
United States increased to record a net inflow of $547
million. At the same time, U.S. direct investment
abroad decreased relative to its first quarter rate, to
register a net decline of $463 million. This was the
first quarter since at least the early l96O’s during
which there was a net U.S. direct disinvestment
abroad. Thus, during the first half of 1976 there was
a significant shift in direct international investment
from a net U.S. outflow in the first quarter to a net
U.S. inflow in the second quarter.
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The data are partial in coverage and are, therefore,
a very incomplete guide to an assessment of the over-
all impact of international transactions on economic
activity. However, the data can be very useful in an
assessment of international investment trends and a
more specific breakdown of the merchandise trade
accounts could be useful for specific industry studies,
In order to assess the overall impact of international
transactions on the U.S. economy, it is necessary to
compute the net impact of these transactions on the
U.S. money stock, Under a system of “managed’> ex-
change rates, the primary channel by which inter-
national trade and capital transactions can have an
impact on aggregate economic activity is via inter-
national reserve flows and their subsequent impact
on the money supply.3 Flowever, one is unable to
gauge the magnitude of this impact by looking at
either the trade or the capital account separately.
For example, the effects on aggregate economic
activity of a deficit in the merchandise trade account
alone could be partially or fully neutralized by a
surplus in one of the capital accounts. If such a
situation arose, the negative aggregate demand (for
domestic output) effects resulting from an increase
in imports of goods would be partially or fully offset
by an inflow of capital and a resulting increase in
investment demand. If the two effects fully offset
each other, there would be no gain or loss of inter-
national reserves and the money supply would not
be affected by the international trade and capital
transactions.
Of all international transactions, the only ones that
affect the money stock are those that affect some
component of the monetary base. Official U.S. hold-
ings of gold and foreign currency balances (primary
reserve assets) and foreign deposits at Federal Re-
serve Banks are the only components of the mone-
tary base that are affected by international transac-
tions, Thus, the entire impact of these transactions
on the money stock can be captured by observing
changes in these items.4
The computations described above have been per-
formed and the results are presented in Table I
under the heading “Monetary Base Effect”. These
figures indicate that the net impact of international
transactions during each quarter from 111/75 to 11/76
~vas to exert upward pressure on the monetary base
and, therefore, on the money stock. During the third
quarter of 1976 these transactions exerted downward
pressure on the monetary base on the order of $381
million. However, when these figures are compared
with the overall changes in the monetary base over
these periods, their significance is brought into better
perspective. In the four quarters from 111/75 to 11/76,
the monetary base effect amounted to 6.6, 0.6, 34.6,
and 21,4 percent, respectively, of the total increase
in the monetary base. In the third quarter of 1976, the
negative impact on the base amounted to 19.4 percent
of the total change.
The year 1976 has been a watershed in the annals
of international monetary reforms. The events of 1976
represent a de facto as well as a de jure defeat for
the advocates of artificially pegged exchange rates.
For those who have long recognized the futility and
folly of such policies, the events of 1976 were evi-
dence of an ideological triumph.
The de facto defeat of the advocates of fixed ex-
change rates is represented by the precipitous decline
in the international value of the Italian lira, the British
pound, and the Mexican peso. These events are a grim
testimony to the unacceptability of fixed exchange
rates between countries which pursue differing do-
mestic economic policies. This unacceptability was
further demonstrated during 1976 by the recurrence
of exchange market crises that plagued efforts to hold
together the European Currency Snake. The de jure
defeat of the fixed rate advocates caine in the form
of a proposed amenchnent to Article IV of the Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetar Fund
(IMF). The proposed amendment to Article IV not
only legalizes floating exchange rates, but also requires
that IMF members avoid manipulating exchange
rates.
The depreciation of the pound, the peso, and the
lira can be explained in terms of relative rates of
5
1
3
y allowing exchange rates to float, most IMP members have
been acting in violation of Article IV for some time, In its
current form, Article IV prohibits the current international
monetary arrangement of managed floating. However, the
amended Article IV, which allows floating, is more represent-
ative of the sentiments of most IMF members and will prob-
ably, therefore, be ratified in the near future.
3
A system of “managed” exchange rates is one in which ex-
change rates are managed through limited official market
intervention rather than rigidly pegged or left alone to float
completely free in response to nongovernmental market in-
fluences. This type of arrangement is descriptive of the ap-
proach taken by the United States since March, 1973.
4
For a more thorough exposition of this view, see Donald 5,
Kemp, “A Monetary View of the Balance of Payments,” this
Reeiew (April 1975), p. 16 and “Balance-of-Payments Con-
cepts — What Do They Really Mean?” this Review (July
1975), p. 16,
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inflation.8 In other words, movements in exchange
rate can be thought of as a means of adjusting price
levels for the effects of differing actual or expected
rates of inflation between two countries. As one
country inflates faster than another, the value of that
country’s currency falls (depreciates) relative to the
value of the low inflation country’s currency. Under
a system of freely floating or loosely managed ex-
change rates, necessary adjustments to differing rates
of inflation are permitted to occur gradually. Flow-
.ever, when exchange rates are narrowly fixed (as
was the case with the Mexican peso prior to Septem-
ber 1976) or tightly managed (as has been the case
with the Italian lira and the British pound since
March 1973) exchange market pressures are not re-
lieved in a slow and orderly fashion. However, once
market participants sense the presence of pent-up
market forces which favor realignment, exchange mar-
ket pressures surge and result in “currency crises”
and sudden large jolts in exchange rates. Thus, while
the relationship between exchange rates and relative
rates of inflation may not be strong in the short run,
the longer the time frame, the stronger this relation-
ship becomes.
The .i.Tre
The exchange rate between the Italian lira and the
U.S. dollar provides a good example of the affects of
differing rates of inflation among trading partners.
Chart I attempts to illustrate this point graphically.
Using March 1973 as a base, an index of the level
of wholesale prices is plotted for the United States
(labeled U.S. WPI) and for Italy (labeled Italy
WPI). The divergence of these two lines over time
indicates that inflation has been greater in Italy (105
percent) than in the United States (44 percent) since
March 1973. If the lira/dollar exchange rate were to
change enough to compensate for these differing rates
of inflation, the result svould be a depreciation of the
lira vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar by an amount equal to
the spread between the two wholesale price lines
(about 61 percentage points).
To see if this has been true, the following computa-
tions were performed. First an index of the exchange
°F’ora snore complete specification of tile relative inflation rate
explanation of exchange s-ate changes, see Donald 5, Kern
“The US, Dollar in International Markets: Mid-1970 to Mi -
1976,” this Review (August 1976), p. 12,
1
Such a depreciation of the lira would mean that the purchas-
ing power of the lira was the sansc in both the United States
and Italy. If the lira did not depreciate in the face of the
higher Italian inflation, then the purchasing power of the lira
would be higher in the United States than it would be in Italy.
1976
rate (expressed as Bra per dollar) was constructed
using March 1973 as a base. The U.S. wholesale price
index was then multiplied by the exchange rate index
in each month through November 1976. The resulting
product series was then plotted on Chart I (labeled
U.S. WPI X lira per $). If exchange rates changed to
compensate for differing rates of inflation, then this
line (henceforth referred to as the product line)
should trace along the Italy WPI line. On the other
hand, if the exchange rate did not change at all, the
product line would trace along the U.S. WPI line.
Chart I indicates that over the long run the product
line has traced the path of the Italy WPI line. As men-
tioned previously, this relationship should not be ex-
pected to hold up in the short run, Inflationary pres-
sures become established only in the long run and the
full impact of differing inflation rates can be resisted
by governments in the short run. I-Iowever, with iso-
lated incidents acting as catalysts to precipitate short-
run surges in exchange rates, inflation rate differen-
tials will exert themselves in the long run.5
In the ease of Italy, the product line traces the rise
in the Italy WPI line fairly closely, with the most
8
Many of the specific events mentioned as affecting exchange
rate movements during the period of interest are discussed
at length in a series of reports titled, “Treasury and Federal
Resen—e ForeignExchange Operations,” These reports are pub-
lished in the March, june, September, and December issues
of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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notable exception occurring between November 1974
and June 1975. This temporary divergence is prima-
rily attributed to a rise in the dollar value of the lira
during this period in light of encouraging economic
news. In particular, during this period there were
three significant developments in Italy: a slowing of
the rate of inflation (as evidenced by the flattening
out of the Italy WPI line), a decline in the balance-of-
trade deficit, and an increase in capital inflows.
However, the situation changed during the last half
of 1975 and into 1976. Renewed downward pressure
on the lira mounted throughout this period as a result
of increased uncertainty about Italy’s political and eco-
nomic outlook. There were signs that inflation was
intensifying, merchandise imports began to rise, and
the country was unable to induce any capital inflows.
On top of this, the coalition government appeared
increasingly fragile and was forced to resign on Janu-
ary 7, 1976. In the face of all of these events, the lira
was supported in foreign exchange markets via mas-
sive official intervention by the Bank of Italy. How-
ever, the Italian government was unable to sustain
its intervention measures beyond January 21 and on
that date the lira was set free to float on the open
market.
Uncertainty over Italy’s economic and political out-
look was continually nourished through April by an
outpouring of bleak economic and political news.
This situation is reflected in Chart Ib ythe steep rise
in the product line which began after mid-1975.
However, in early May 1976 the Italian government
imposed sweeping exchange restrictions — including
a 50 percent deposit scheme on nearly all purchases
of foreign currency. The lira appreciated somewhat
relative to the dollar as a result of these moves and
the product line moved back into alignment with the
Italy WPI line. By the beginning of September the
effects of the import deposit scheme had begun to
dissipate and, in the absence of any further policy
initiative by the government, the lira began to move
again in a direction consistent with its relatively high
rate of inflation; that is, it depreciated against the
dollar. As a result, the product line in Chart I began
to rise again along a path similar to that traced by
the Italy WPI line.
The same three series that were plotted for Italy in
Chart I are plotted for the United Kingdom in Chart
II. The product hue (labeled U.S. WPI x£per $)
follows the same general pattern as the product line
C>>,,, ti
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for Italy prior to 1976. That is, it traces the rise in
the United Kingdom wholesale price line fairly
closely, with the major deviation occurring between
November 1974 and March 1975. This divergence re-
flects a relatively stable pound-dollar exchange rate
in the face of a slowdown in the rate of inflation in
the United States and unabated inflation in the
United Kingdom. The steadiness of the pound vis-a-
vis the dollar during this period is primarily attribu-
table to the poor performance of the U.S. economy,
the anticipation of an accelerated decline in U.S.
interest rates, and an improvement in Britain’s trade
account in early 1975.
However, the pound began to depreciate vis-a-vis
the dollar during April 1975. This was the result of
new evidence of continued high rates of inflation in
the face of continually rising unemployment in the
United Kingdom. Moreover, concern mounted that a
continuing trend of lower British interest rates would
generate large capital outflows. The result of this re-
newed depreciation was a closing of the gap between
the product line and the U. K. WPI line.
The pound stabilized in late 1975 and showed little
change in early 1976. The voluntary wage restraint
program was having its desired effect and hence was
helping to curb the reported rate of inflation. During
this period an apparent shift in priorities within the
government began to emerge. That is, the government
began to talk more about bolstering productivity and
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less about broad social welfare programs. In addition,
during this period large interest rate differentials stim-
ulated significant inflows of capital. The resulting sta-
bility of the pound during this period can he seen in
Chart II as a flattening of the product line and its
subsequent divergence from the U. K. WPI line.
However, developments in late February 1976 pre-
cipitated new doubts about the future of the pound.
Economic indicators showed little evidence of a re-
covery and indicated a likelihood of continuing infla-
tion and still rising unemployment. In addition, in- -
terest rates began to decline and thus the differential
favoring investments in the United Kingdom began to
erode. Given the already uncertain economic and po-
litical environment, these factors resulted in renewed
depreciation of the pound in early March 1976. As a
result, the product line in Chart II surged upward to
reach a point considerably above the U. K. WPI line
by June.
The economic news coming out of the United King-
dom began to improve in early July. There were
indications that both exports and real output were
increasing at a faster than anticipated rate and that
wholesale price increases were slowing. In addition,
there were reports that the government was formulat-
ing plans for substantial public expenditure cuts. These
factors combined to stabilize the pound-dollar ex-
change rate during July and August and thus the
product line flattened out during that period.
However, a number of factors came to light in late
August which precipitated a return of the pound to
its downward trend. The release of figures showing
increased unemployment during July led to fears that
the government’s commitment to reduce public spend-
ing might be abandoned. In addition, a sharp increase
in the U. K. money supply in July was announced. In
the face of these developments, the United Kingdom
was beginning to feel the effects of the severe summer
drought, and the possibility of further employment
and production cutbacks increased as a result. The
resulting depreciation of the pound caused the prod-
uct line to move upward again to a level significantly
above the U. K. WPI line.
The data series presented in Chart III are similar
to those presented in Charts I and II. One difference,
however, is that the indices presented in Chart III are
on a 1954 base rather than a March 1973 base. An-
other difference between Chart III and Charts I and
II is that it has two different horizontal scales. The
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left hand portion of the chart is made up of annual
observations (1954 - 1975) while the right hand por-
tion plots monthly observations (January 1976 - No-
vember 1976). The absence of a product line in the
left side (annual data side) of Chart III reflects the
fact that the peso/dollar exchange rate was not al-
lowed to change between 1954 and August 31, 1976.
The performance of the Mexican peso in the past
few months is a grim testimony to the effects of at-
tempts by a government to peg the external value of
its currency in the face of an inflation rate which dif-
fers significantly from that of a major trading partner.
The peso/dollar exchange rate was rigidly pegged at
12.5 pesos/dollar between 1954 and September 1976.
However, as indicated by Chart III, the overall
amount of inflation experienced by Mexico between
1954 and 1975 far exceeded that experienced by the
United States during this period.
Between 1964 and 1969 the gap between the two
WPI lines in Chart III stabilized, indicating that the
inflation rate Was about the same in the United States
as in Mexico during this period. However, since 1973
Mexico’s rate of inflation has greatly exceeded that
experienced in the United States. As a result, import
growth began to far outstrip export growth during
the early 1970’s and Mexican debt to foreigners began
to rise alarmingly. It has been estimated that interest
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costs on this debt amount to at least $1.8 billion per
year, while total Mexican merchandise export earnings
in 1975 were only 82.9 billion (versus an import bill
totaling $6.6 billion). Thus, the ahilit of Mexico to
service any increased foreign debt came into question
and their access to international financial markets was
restricted accordingly.
The distressing economic ontlook described above,
coupled with the political uncertainties surrounding
the impending change of governments on December 1,
precipitated ever increasing downward pressure on
the peso. As a result, on September 1, 1976 the Mexi-
can government decided that it had no choice hut to
allow the peso to float freely on the open market.
The immediate response of the peso was a precipi-
tous decline from 12.5 pesos/dollar to about 20 pesos/
dollar, This decline is indicated by the sharp rise
in the product line (labeled U.S. WPI )< peso per .$)
in the right hand section of Chart III. The Bank of
Mexico began to intervene in the peso mnarket to peg
it at 19.7 pesos/dollar on September 13, 1976. lIow-
ever, continued uncertainty over the political and eco-
nomic outlook in Mexico resulted in an intensification
of capital outflows and downward pressure on the
peso. As these pressures mounted, the intervention
activities of the Bank of Mexico led to a significant
loss of official reserves.
With Mexico’s application for a medium-term IMF
loan still under negotiation, the authorities decided
to allow the peso to float freely again on October 27.
The immediate response was a further depreciation
of the peso to about 26 pesos/dollar. This second de-
cline in the value of the peso is indicated by a further
rise in the product line in Chart III to a level con-
siderably above the Mexico WPI line.
Throughout November the Bank of Mexico inter-
vened frequently in an attempt to stabilize the peso/S
exchange rate. However, a series of events, ranging
from government expropriation of private land to
rumors of a military coup, fueled political uncertainty
during this period. Because of reserve losses, and the
prospect for even greater losses in the near future,
the Bank of Mexico decided to cease all intervention
DECEMBER 1976
activities as of November 22. At the same time, tem-
porary regulations which strictly limited commercial
bank dealings in foreign exchange were enacted. In
the weeks immediately following these actions, the
peso reversed its downward trend and rose in value
relative to the dollar. However, considerable political
and economic uncertainty remains and the market
continues to speculate about the course of the Mex-
ican economy under the administration which came
into office on December 1.”
This article has sought to review U.S. international
trade and financial developments over the last year
or so. In taking such an overview, there is one com-
mon theme that continually surfaces. That theme re-
lates to the desirability of fixed versus floatiug ex-
change rates in the world today.
It is shown in the article that efforts to artificially
support a particular exchange rate were doomed to
failure. The shocks that resulted from the inevitable
large changes in exchange rates were greater than
those that would have resulted if exchange rates
would have been allowed to change gradually as
market pressure developed. On the other hand, the
United States policy of maintaining a relatively free
market for the dollar insulated this nation from the
kind of shocks experienced by Italy, the United King-
dom, and Mexico.’°While there was considerable vari-
ation in U.S. trade and capital flows during the last
year or so, the United States was spared the kind of
exchange market crises that were continually plaguing
these other countries and that plagued the United
States itself from the late 1960’s until March 1973.
tAt the close of trading on Decemnber 15 the peso was being
quoted at 20 peso/dollar. Thus, it had risen back up to the
level it attained aftcr the first float in September. Although
Chart III does not cover the events of December, this recent
appreciation would imply a decline of the prodoct line back to
abont the 340 level.
1 >>>>ln this regard, of a total of 816 billion worth of foreign ex-
change market intenention conducted by governments around
the world between August and October 1976, the Federal
Re.sen’e was responsible for only $63.4 million. Statemnent by
Scott F. Pardee, New York Times, 2 December 1976, p. 80.
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